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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a new program simplification technique called
program trimming that aims to improve the scalability and precision
of safety checking tools. Given a program P, program trimming
generates a new program P ′ such that P and P ′ are equi-safe (i.e.,
P ′ has a bug if and only if P has a bug), but P ′ has fewer execution
paths than P. Since many program analyzers are sensitive to the
number of execution paths, program trimming has the potential to
improve the effectiveness of safety checking tools.
In addition to introducing the concept of program trimming, this
paper also presents a lightweight static analysis that can be used
as a pre-processing step to remove program paths while retaining
equi-safety. We have implemented the proposed technique in a
tool called Trimmer and evaluate it in the context of two program
analysis techniques, namely abstract interpretation and dynamic
symbolic execution. Our experiments show that program trimming
significantly improves the effectiveness of both techniques.
KEYWORDS
Condition inference, abstract interpretation, dynamic symbolic ex-
ecution
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to its potential to dramatically simplify programs with respect
to a certain criterion (e.g., the value of a program variable at a
given location), program slicing [85] has been the focus of decades
of research in the program analysis community [84]. In addition
to being useful for program understanding, slicing also has the
potential to improve the scalability of bug-finding and verification
tools by removing irrelevant code snippets with respect to some
property of interest. Yet, despite this potential, relatively few bug-
finding and verification tools use slicing as a pre-processing step.
In this paper, we argue that existing notions of a “program slice”
do not adequately capture the kinds of program simplification that
are beneficial to safety checking tools. Instead, we propose a new se-
mantic program simplification technique called program trimming,
which removes program paths that are irrelevant to the safety prop-
erty of interest. Given a program P, program trimming generates a
simplified program P ′ such that P ′ violates a safety property if and
only if the original program P does (i.e., P and P ′ are equi-safe).
However, P ′ has the advantage of containing fewer execution paths
than P. Since the scalability and precision of many program ana-
lyzers depend on the number of program paths, program trimming
can have a positive impact on many kinds of program analyses,
particularly those that are not property directed.
To illustrate the difference between the standard notion of pro-
gram slicing and our proposed notion of program trimming, con-
sider the following very simple program, where ⋆ indicates a non-
deterministic value (e.g., user input):
1 x := ⋆; y := ⋆;
2 if (y > 0) { while (x < 10) { x := x + y; } }
3 else { x := x - 1; }
4 assert x > 0;
Suppose that our goal is to prove the assertion; so, we are inter-
ested in the value of x at line 4. Now, every single statement in this
program is relevant to determining the value of x; hence, there is
nothing that can be removed using program slicing. However, ob-
serve that the then branch of the if statement is actually irrelevant
to the assertion. Since this part of the program can never result in a
program state where the value of x is less than 10, lines 2 and 3 can
be simplified without affecting whether or not the assertion can
fail. Hence, for the purposes of safety checking, the above program
is equivalent to the following much simpler trimmed program P ′:
1 x := ⋆; y := ⋆;
2 assume y <= 0;
3 x := x - 1;
4 assert x > 0;
Observe that P ′ contains far fewer paths compared to the origi-
nal program P. In fact, while P contains infinitely many execution
paths, the trimmed program P ′ contains only two, one through
the successful and one through the failing branch of the assertion.
Consequently, program analyzers that eagerly explore all program
paths, such as bounded model checkers [14, 28] and symbolic exe-
cution engines [65], can greatly benefit from program trimming in
terms of scalability. Furthermore, since many static analyzers (e.g.,
abstract interpreters [31]) typically lose precision at join points
of the control flow graph, program trimming can improve their
precision by removing paths that are irrelevant to a safety property.
Motivated by these observations, this paper introduces the notion
of failure-directed program trimming and presents a lightweight
algorithm to remove execution paths in a way that guarantees equi-
safety. The key idea underlying our approach is to statically infer
safety conditions, which are sufficient conditions for correctness
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and can be computed in a lightweight way. Our technique then
negates these safety conditions to obtain trimming conditions, which
are necessary conditions for the program to fail. The trimming
conditions are used to instrument the program with assumptions
such that program paths that violate an assumption are pruned.
Program trimming is meant as a lightweight but effective pre-
processing step for program analyzers that check safety. We have
implemented our proposed trimming algorithm in a tool called
Trimmer and used it to pre-process hundreds of programs, most
of which are taken from the software verification competition (SV-
COMP) [11]. We have also evaluated the impact of trimming in the
context of twowidely-used program analysis techniques, namely ab-
stract interpretation [31] and dynamic symbolic execution [18, 50].
Our experiments with Crab [48, 49] (an abstract interpreter) show
that program trimming can considerably improve the precision of
static analyzers. Furthermore, our experiments with Klee [17] (a
dynamic symbolic execution tool) show that program trimming
allows the dynamic symbolic execution engine to find more bugs
and verify more programs within a given resource limit.
To summarize, this paper makes the following key contributions:
• We introduce the notion of program trimming as a new kind of
program simplification technique.
• We propose an effective and lightweight inference engine for
computing safety conditions.
• We describe a modular technique for instrumenting the program
with trimming conditions.
• We demonstrate empirically that program trimming has a signif-
icant positive impact on the effectiveness of program analyzers.
For instance, the cheapest configuration of Crab (an abstract
interpreter) with trimming proves 21% more programs safe than
the most expensive configuration of Crab without trimming in
less than 70% of the time. In the context of a dynamic symbolic
execution engine (Klee), trimming increases both the number
of uncovered bugs by up to 30% and the number of verified pro-
grams by up to 18% while reducing the running time by up to
30%.
2 GUIDED TOUR
The running example, shown in Figure 1, is written in C extended
with assume and assert statements. Note that the example is inten-
tionally quite artificial to illustrate the main ideas behind our tech-
nique. Procedure main assigns a non-deterministic integer value
to variable m and computes its factorial using the recursive fact
procedure. The (light and dark) gray boxes are discussed below
and should be ignored for now. We examine two variations of this
example: one for dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) engines and
another for abstract interpreters (AI).
Motivation #1: scalability. First, let us ignore the assertion on
line 8 and only consider the one on line 16. Clearly, this assertion
cannot fail unless m is equal to 123. Observe that procedure main
contains infinitely many execution paths because the number of
recursive calls to fact depends on the value of m, which is uncon-
strained. Consequently, a dynamic symbolic execution engine, like
Klee, would have to explore (a number of) these paths until it finds
the bug or exceeds its resource limit. However, there is only one
buggy execution path in this program, meaning that the dynamic
1 int fact(int n) {
2 assume 0 <= n;
3 assume n != 0; // AI
4 int r = 1;
5 if (n != 0) {
6 r = n * fact(n - 1);
7 }
8 assert n != 0 || r == 1; // AI
9 return r;
10 }
11
12 void main() {
13 int m = ⋆;
14 assume m == 123; // DSE
15 int f = fact(m);
16 assert m != 123 || f == 0; // DSE
17 }
Figure 1: Running example illustrating program trimming.
symbolic execution engine is wasting its resources exploring paths
that cannot possibly fail.
Our approach. Now, let us see how program trimming can
help a symbolic execution tool in the context of this example. As
mentioned in Section 1, our program trimming technique first com-
putes safety conditions, which are sufficient conditions for the rest of
the program to be correct. In this sense, standard weakest precondi-
tions [37] are instances of safety conditions. However, automatically
computing safety conditions precisely, for instance via weakest pre-
condition calculi [37, 69], abstract interpretation [31], or predicate
abstraction [4, 52], can become very expensive (especially in the
presence of loops or recursion), making such an approach unsuit-
able as a pre-processing step for program analyzers that already
check safety. Instead, we use lightweight techniques to infer safety
conditions that describe a subset of the safe executions in the pro-
gram. That is, the safety conditions inferred by our approach can be
stronger than necessary, but they are still useful for ruling out many
program paths that “obviously” cannot violate a safety property.
In contrast to a safety condition, a trimming condition at a given
program point reflects a necessary condition for the rest of the
program execution to fail. Since a necessary condition for a property
¬Q can be obtained using the negation of a sufficient condition for
Q , we can compute a valid trimming condition for a program point
π as the negation of the safety condition at π . Thus, our approach
trims the program by instrumenting it with assumptions of the form
assume ϕ, where ϕ is the negation of the safety condition for that
program point. Since condition ϕ is, by construction, necessary for
the program to fail, the trimmed program preserves the safety of the
original program. Moreover, since execution terminates as soon as
we encounter an assumption violation, instrumenting the program
with trimming conditions prunes program paths in a semantic way.
Program trimming on this example. Revisiting our running
example from Figure 1, the safety condition right after line 15 is
m != 123 || f == 0. Since procedure fact called at line 15 neither
contains any assertions nor modifies the value of m, a valid safety
condition right before line 15 is m != 123. Indeed, in executions
that reach line 15 and satisfy this safety condition, the assertion
does not fail. We can now obtain a sound trimming condition by
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negating the safety condition. This allows us to instrument the
program with the assume statement shown in the dark gray box of
line 14. Any execution that does not satisfy this condition is correct
and is effectively removed by the assume statement in a way that
preserves safety. As a result, a dynamic symbolic execution tool
running on the instrumented program will only explore the single
execution path containing the bug and will not waste any resources
on provably correct paths. Observe that a bounded model checker
would similarly benefit from this kind of instrumentation.
Motivation #2: precision. To see how our approach might im-
prove the precision of program analysis, let us ignore the assertion
on line 16 and only consider the one on line 8. Since n = 0 implies
r = 1 on line 8, this assertion can clearly never fail. However, an
abstract interpreter, like Crab, using intervals [31] cannot prove
this assertion due to the inherent imprecision of the underlying
abstract domain. In particular, the abstract interpreter knows that n
is non-negative at the point of the assertion but has no information
about r (i.e., its abstract state is⊤). Hence, it does not have sufficient
information to discharge the assertion at line 8.
Suppose, however, that our technique can infer the safety condi-
tion n = 0 on line 3. Using this condition, we can now instrument
this line with the trimming condition n != 0, which corresponds
to the assumption in the light gray box. If we run the same abstract
interpreter on the instrumented program, it now knows that n is
strictly greater than 0 and can therefore prove the assertion even
though it is using the same interval abstract domain. Hence, as
this example illustrates, program trimming can also be useful for
improving the precision of static analyzers in verification tasks.
3 PROGRAM TRIMMING
In this section, we formally present the key insight behind failure-
directed program trimming using a simple imperative language in
the style of IMP [86], augmented with assert and assume state-
ments. This lays the foundation for understanding the safety condi-
tion inference, which is described in the next section and is defined
for a more expressive language. Here, we present the semantics of
the IMP language using big-step operational semantics, specifically
using judgments of the form ⟨σ , s⟩ ⇓φ σ ′ where:
• s is a program statement,
• σ ,σ ′ are valuations mapping program variables to values,
• φ ∈ { , ♦,✓} indicates whether an assertion violation occurred
( ), an assumption was violated (♦), or neither assertion nor
assumption violations were encountered (denoted✓).
We assume that the program terminates as soon as an assertion or as-
sumption violation is encountered.We also ignore non-determinism
to simplify the presentation.
Definition 3.1. (Failing execution)We say that an execution of
s under σ is failing iff ⟨s,σ ⟩ ⇓ σ ′, and successful otherwise.
In other words, a failing execution exhibits an assertion violation.
Executions with assumption violations also terminate immediately
but are not considered failing.
Definition 3.2. (Equi-safety)We say that two programs s, s ′ are
equi-safe iff, for all valuations σ , we have:
⟨s,σ ⟩ ⇓ σ ′ ⇐⇒ ⟨s ′,σ ⟩ ⇓ σ ′
In other words, two programs are equi-safe if they exhibit the
same set of failing executions starting from the same state σ . Thus,
program s ′ has a bug if and only if s has a bug.
As mentioned in Section 1, the goal of program trimming is to
obtain a program s ′ that (a) is equi-safe to s and (b) can terminate
early in successful executions of s:
Definition 3.3. (Trimmed program) A program s ′ is a trimmed
version of s iff s, s ′ are equi-safe and
(1) ⟨s,σ ⟩ ⇓✓ σ ′ =⇒ ⟨s ′,σ ⟩ ⇓✓ σ ′ ∨ ⟨s ′,σ ⟩ ⇓♦ σ ′′
(2) ⟨s,σ ⟩ ⇓♦ σ ′ =⇒ ⟨s ′,σ ⟩ ⇓♦ σ ′′
Here, the first condition says that the trimmed program s ′ ei-
ther exhibits the same successful execution as the original pro-
gram or terminates early with an assumption violation. The second
condition says that, if the original program terminates with an
assumption violation, then the trimmed program also violates an
assumption but can terminate in a different state σ ′′. In the latter
case, we allow the trimmed program to end in a different state σ ′′
than the original program because the assumption violation could
occur earlier in the trimmed program. Intuitively, from a program
analysis perspective, we can think of trimming as a program simpli-
fication technique that prunes execution paths that are guaranteed
not to result in an assertion violation.
Observe that program trimming preserves all terminating execu-
tions of program s . In other words, if s terminates under valuation
σ , then the trimmed version s ′ is also guaranteed to terminate.
However, program trimming does not give any guarantees about
non-terminating executions. Hence, even though this technique is
suitable as a pre-processing technique for safety checking, it does
not necessarily need to preserve liveness properties. For example,
non-terminating executions of s can become terminating in s ′.
The definition of program trimming presented above does not
impose any syntactic restrictions on the trimmed program. For
instance, it allows program trimming to add and remove arbitrary
statements as long as the resulting program satisfies the properties
of Definition 3.3. However, in practice, it is desirable to make some
syntactic restrictions on how trimming can be performed. In this
paper, we perform program trimming by adding assumptions to the
original program rather than removing statements. Even though
this transformation does not “simplify” the program from a program
understanding point of view, it is very useful to subsequent program
analyzers because the introduction of assume statements prunes
program paths in a semantic way.
4 STATIC ANALYSIS FOR TRIMMING
As mentioned in Section 1, our trimming algorithm consists of
two phases, where we infer safety conditions using a lightweight
static analysis in the first phase and instrument the program with
trimming conditions in the next phase. In this section, we describe
the safety condition inference.
4.1 Programming Language
In order to precisely describe our trimming algorithm, we first intro-
duce a small, but realistic, call-by-value imperative language with
pointers and procedure calls. As shown in Figure 2, a program in this
language consists of one or more procedure definitions. Statements
3
Program P ::= prc
Procedure prc ::= proc prc(vin) : vout {s}
Statement s ::= s1; s2 | v := e | v1 := ∗v2 | ∗v := e
| v := malloc(e) | v := call prc(v¯)
| assert p | assume p
| if (⋆) {s1} else {s2}
Expression e ::= v | c | e1 ⊕ e2 (⊕ ∈ {+,−,×})
Predicate p ::= e1 ⊘ e2 (⊘ ∈ {<, >,=})
| p1 ∧ p2 | p1 ∨ p2 | ¬p
Figure 2: Programming language used for formalization.
The notation s denotes a sequence s1, . . . , sn .
include sequencing, assignments, heap reads and writes, memory
allocation, procedure calls, assertions, assumptions, and condition-
als. Since loops can be expressed as tail-recursive procedures, we do
not introduce an additional loop construct. Also, observe that we
only allow conditionals with non-deterministic predicates, denoted
⋆. However, a conditional of the form if (p) {s1} else {s2} can
be expressed as follows in this language:
if (⋆) {assume p; s1} else {assume ¬p; s2}
Since the language is quite standard, we do not present its oper-
ational semantics in detail. However, as explained in Section 3, we
assume that the execution of a program terminates as soon as we
encounter an assertion or assumption violation (i.e., the predicate
evaluates to false). As in Section 3, we use the term failing execution
to indicate a program run with an assertion violation.
4.2 Safety Condition Inference
Recall from Section 1, that a safety condition at a given program
point π is a sufficient condition for any execution starting at π to
be error free. More precisely, a safety condition for a (terminating)
statement s is a formulaφ such thatφ ⇒ wp(s, true), wherewp(s,ϕ)
denotes the weakest precondition of s with respect to postcondition
ϕ [37]. While the most precise safety condition is wp(s, true), our
analysis intentionally infers stronger safety conditions so that trim-
ming can be used as a pre-processing technique for safety checkers.
Our safety condition inference engine is formalized using the
rules shown in Figure 3. Our formalization makes use of an “oracle”
Λ for resolving queries about pointer aliasing and procedure side
effects. For instance, this oracle can be implemented using a scalable
pointer analysis, such as the Data Structure Analysis (DSA) method
of Lattner et al. [68]. In the rest of this section, we assume that the
oracle for resolving aliasing queries is flow-insensitive.
Figure 3 includes two types of inference rules, one for state-
ments and one for procedures. Both forms of judgments utilize a
summary environment ϒ that maps each procedure prc to its corre-
sponding safety condition (or “summary”). Since our programming
language contains recursive procedures, we would, in general, need
to perform a fixed-point computation to obtain sound and precise
summaries. However, because our analysis initializes summaries
conservatively, the analysis can terminate at any point to produce
sound results.
(1)
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s2 : Φ2
Λ, ϒ,Φ2 ⊢ s1 : Φ1
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s1; s2 : Φ1
(2) Φ
′ ≡ Φ[e/v]
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ v := e : Φ′
(3) Φ
′ ≡ Φ[drf (v2)/v1]
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ v1 := ∗v2 : Φ′
(4) Φ
′ ≡ store(drf (v), e,Λ,Φ)
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ ∗v := e : Φ′
(5) Φ
′ ≡ ∀v .Φ
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ v := malloc(e) : Φ′
(6)
α ≡ modLocs(prc,Λ)
Φs ≡ ∀v . havoc(α ,Λ,Φ)
Φ′ ≡ Φs ∧ summary(prc, ϒ,vact )
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ v := call prc(vact ) : Φ′
(7) Φ
′ ≡ p ∧ Φ
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ assert p : Φ′
(8) Φ
′ ≡ p ⇒ Φ
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ assume p : Φ′
(9)
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s1 : Φ1
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s2 : Φ2
Φ′ ≡ Φ1 ∧ Φ2
Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ if (⋆) {s1} else {s2} : Φ′
(10)
Λ, ϒ, true ⊢ s : Φ
ϒ′ ≡ ϒ[prc 7→ Φ]
Λ, ϒ ⊢ proc prc(vin) : vout {s} : ϒ′
Figure 3: Inference rules for computing safety conditions.
With the exception of rule (10), all rules in Figure 3 derive judg-
ments of the form Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s : Φ′. The meaning of this judgment is
that, using environments Λ and ϒ, it is provable that {Φ′}s{Φ} is a
valid Hoare triple (i.e., Φ′ ⇒ wp(s,Φ) if s terminates). Similarly to
the computation of standard weakest preconditions [37], our anal-
ysis propagates safety conditions backward but sacrifices precision
to improve scalability. In the following discussion, we only focus
on those rules where our inference engine differs from standard
precondition computation.
Heap reads and writes. An innovation underlying our safety
condition inference is the handling of the heap. Given a store opera-
tion ∗v := e , this statement can modify the value of all expressions
∗x , where x is an alias of v . Hence, a sound way to model the heap
is to rewrite ∗v := e as
∗v := e; if (v = v1) ∗v1 := e; . . . ; if (v = vk ) ∗vk := e;
where v1, . . . ,vk are potential aliases of v . Effectively, this strategy
accounts for the “side effects” of statement ∗v := e to other heap
locations by explicitly introducing additional statements. These
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statements are of the form if (v = vi ) ∗vi := e , i.e., if v and vi are
indeed aliases, then change the value of expression ∗vi to e .
While the strategy outlined above is sound, it unfortunately
conflicts with our goal of computing safety conditions using light-
weight analysis. In particular, since we use a coarse, but scalable
alias analysis, most pointers have a large number of possible aliases
in practice. Hence, introducing a linear number of conditionals
causes a huge blow-up in the size of the safety conditions computed
by our technique. To prevent this blow-up, our inference engine
computes a safety precondition that is stronger than necessary by
using the following conservative store operation.
Definition 4.1. (Memory location)We represent memory loca-
tions using terms that belong to the following grammar:
Memory location α := v | drf (α)
Here, v represents any program variable, and drf is an uninter-
preted function representing the dereference of a memory location.
To define our conservative store operation, we make use of a
function aliases(v,Λ) that uses oracle Λ to retrieve all memory
locations α that may alias v .
Definition 4.2. (Store operation) Let derefs(Φ) denote all α ′ for
which a sub-term drf (α ′) occurs in formula Φ. Then,
store(drf (α), e,Λ,Φ) := Φ[e/drf (α)] ∧
∧
αi ∈A\{α }
αi , α
where A ≡ aliases(α ,Λ) ∩ derefs(Φ)
In other words, we compute the precondition for statement
∗v := e as though the store operation was a regular assignment, but
we also “assert” that v is distinct from every memory location αi
that can potentially alias v . To see why this is correct, observe that
Φ[e/drf (v)] gives the weakest precondition of ∗v := e when v does
not have any aliases. If v does have aliases that are relevant to the
safety condition, then the conjunct
∧
αi ∈A\{v } αi , v evaluates to
false, meaning that we can never guarantee the safety of the pro-
gram. Thus, store(drf (v), e,Λ,Φ) logically implies wp(∗v := e,Φ).
Example 4.3. Consider the following code snippet:
if (⋆) {assume x = y;a := 3; }
else {assume x , y; ∗y := 3; }
∗x := a; t := ∗y;
assert t = 3;
Right before the heap write ∗x := a, our analysis infers the safety
condition drf (y) = 3 ∧ x , y. Before the heap write ∗y := 3, the
safety condition is x , y, which causes the condition before the
assumption assume x , y to be true. This means that executions
through the else branch are verified and may be trimmed because
x and y are not aliases for these executions.
Interprocedural analysis. We now turn our attention to the
handling of procedure calls. As mentioned earlier, we perform
interprocedural analysis in a modular way, computing summaries
for each procedure. Specifically, a summary ϒ(f ) for procedure f
is a sufficient condition for any execution of f to be error free.
With this intuition in mind, let us consider rule (6) for analyzing
procedure calls of the form v := call prc(e¯). Suppose that α¯ is the
set of memory locations modified by the callee prc but expressed
in terms of the memory locations in the caller. Then, similarly to
other modular interprocedural analyses [8, 9], we conservatively
model the effect of the statement v := call prc(vact ) as follows:
assert summary(prc);
havoc v ; havoc α¯ ;
Here, havoc α denotes a statement that assigns an unknown value
to memory location α . Hence, our treatment of procedure calls
asserts that the safety condition for prc holds before the call and that
the values of all memory locations modified in prc are “destroyed”.
While our general approach is similar to prior techniques on
modular analysis [8, 9], there are some subtleties in our context to
which we would like to draw the reader’s attention. First, since our
procedure summaries (i.e., safety conditions) are not provided by the
user, but instead inferred by our algorithm (see rule (10)), we must
be conservative about how summaries are “initialized”. In particular,
because our analysis aims to be lightweight, we do not want to
perform an expensive fixed-point computation in the presence of
recursive procedures. Therefore, we use the following summary
function to yield a conservative summary for each procedure.
Definition 4.4. (Procedure summary) Let hasAsrts(f ) be a pred-
icate that yields true iff procedure f or any of its (transitive) callees
contain an assertion. Then,
summary(f , ϒ, v¯) =

ϒ(f )[v¯/vin] if f ∈ dom(ϒ)
false if hasAsrts(f )
true otherwise
In other words, if procedure f is in the domain of ϒ (meaning
that it has previously been analyzed), we use the safety condition
given by ϒ(f ), substituting formals by the actuals. However, if f
has not yet been analyzed, we then use the conservative summary
false if f or any of its callees have assertions, and true otherwise.
Observe that, if f is not part of a strongly connected component
(SCC) in the call graph, we can always obtain the precise summary
for f by analyzing the program bottom-up. However, if f is part
of an SCC, we can still soundly analyze the caller by using the
conservative summaries given by summary(f , ϒ, v¯).
The other subtlety about our interprocedural analysis is the
particular way in which havocking is performed. Since the callee
maymodify heap locations accessible in the caller, we define a havoc
operation that uses the store function from earlier to conservatively
deal with memory locations.
Definition 4.5. (Havoc operation)
havoc(drf (α),Λ,Φ) := ∀vnew . store(drf (α),vnew ,Λ,Φ)
where vnew < freeVars(Φ)
havoc(α ,Λ,Φ) := havoc(tail(α),Λ, havoc(head(α),Λ,Φ))
Observe that the above definition differs from the standard way
this operation is typically defined [8]. In particular, given a scalar
variable v , the assignment v := ⋆, and its postcondition ϕ, the
standard way to compute a conservative precondition for the as-
signment is ∀v .ϕ (i.e., ϕ must hold for any value of v). Note that
an alternative way of computing the precondition is ∀x .ϕ[x/v],
where x is not a free variable in ϕ. In the context of scalars, these
two definitions are essentially identical, but the latter view allows
us to naturally extend our definition to heap locations by using
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the previously defined store function. Specifically, given a heap
location drf (α) modified by the callee, we model the effect of this
modification as ∀vnew . store(drf (α),vnew ,Λ,Φ).
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ s : Φ′, and assume that Λ
provides sound information about aliasing and procedure side effects.
Then, under the condition that s terminates and that the summaries
provided by ϒ are sound, we have Φ′ ⇒ wp(s,Φ). 1
5 PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION
In the previous section, we discussed how to infer safety conditions
for each program point. Recall that program trimming annotates
the code with trimming conditions, which are necessary conditions
for failure. Here, we describe how we instrument the program with
suitable assumptions that preserve safety of the original program.
Intraprocedural instrumentation. First, let us ignore proce-
dure calls and consider instrumenting a single procedure in isola-
tion. Specifically, consider a procedure with body s1; . . . ; sn and let:
Λ, ϒ, true ⊢ si ; . . . ; sn : Φ
We instrument the program with the statement assume ¬Φ right
before statement si if si complies with the instrumentation strategy
specified by the user (see Section 6). In general, note that we do not
instrument at every single instruction because subsequent safety
checkers must also analyze the assumptions, which adds overhead
to their analysis.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that our technique adds a statement assume
Φ before si ; . . . ; sn . Then, Φ is a necessary condition for si ; . . . ; sn to
have an assertion violation.
Interprocedural instrumentation. One of the key challenges
in performing program instrumentation is how to handle proce-
dure calls. In particular, we cannot simply annotate a procedure f
using the safety conditions computed for f . The following example
illustrates why such a strategy would be unsound.
Example 5.2. Consider procedures foo, bar, and baz:
proc foo(x) {∗x := 2; }
proc bar(a) {x := malloc(a); foo(x); assert a < 100; }
proc baz(b) {x := malloc(b); foo(x); assert b > 10; }
Here, the safety condition for procedure foo is just true since foo
does not contain assertions or have calleeswith assertions. However,
observe that we cannot simply instrument foo with assume false
because there are assertions after the call to foo in bar and baz.
One possible solution to this challenge is to only instrument the
main method, which would be very ineffective. Another possible
strategy might be to propagate safety conditions top-down from
callers to callees in a separate pass. However, this latter strategy
also has some drawbacks. For instance, in this example, variables
a and b are not in scope in foo; hence, there is no meaningful
instrumentation we could add to foo short of assume true, which
is the same as having no instrumentation at all.
We solve this challenge by performing a program transformation
inspired by previous work [53, 66]. The key idea underlying this
program transformation is to create, for each procedure prc, a new
1Proofs or proof sketches for all theorems can be found in the appendix.
procedure prc′ that can never fail. In particular, we create prc′
by (a) changing all assertions assert ϕ in prc to assume ϕ, and
(b) replacing all calls to f (including recursive ones) with f ′. Now,
given a call site of prc, v := call prc(e¯), we replace it with the
following conditional:
if (⋆) {v := call prc′(e¯); }
else {v := call prc(e¯); assume false; }
This transformation is semantics preserving since it is merely
a case analysis: Either prc succeeds, in which case it is safe to
replace the call to prc with prc′, or it fails, in which case we can
call original prc but add assume false afterward since prc has failed.
The following example illustrates this transformation.
Example 5.3. Consider the following procedures:
proc foo(x ,y) {assert x > 0; bar(y); }
proc bar(z) {assert z > 0; }
proc main(x ,y) {foo(x ,y); }
Our transformation yields the following new program:
proc foo’(x ,y) {assume x > 0; bar’(y); }
proc foo(x ,y) {
assert x > 0;
if (⋆) {bar’(y); }
else {bar(y); assume false; }
}
proc bar’(z) {assume z > 0; }
proc bar(z) {assert z > 0; }
proc main(x ,y) {
if (⋆) {foo’(x ,y); }
else {foo(x ,y); assume false; }
}
The main advantage of this transformation is that it allows us to
perform program instrumentation in a modular and conceptually
simple way. In particular, we do not need to instrument the “safe”
version prc′ of a procedure prc since prc′ never fails. On the other
hand, it is safe to instrument prcwith the negation of the local safety
conditions since every call site of prc is followed by the statement
assume false (i.e., execution terminates immediately after the call).
Example 5.4. Consider the following procedures foo and bar:
proc foo(x) {assert x > 10; }
proc bar(a,x) {foo(x); assert a < 100; }
Our instrumentation yields the following new program:
proc foo’(x) {assume x > 10; }
proc foo(x) {assume x ≤ 10; assert x > 10; }
proc bar(a,x) {
assume a ≥ 100 ∨ x ≤ 10;
if (⋆) {foo’(x); }
else {foo(x); assume false; }
assert a < 100;
}
Discussion. The reader may notice that our program transfor-
mation introduces additional branches that did not exist in the
original program. Since the goal of program trimming is to reduce
the number of execution paths while retaining equi-safety, this
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transformation may seem counter-intuitive. However, because one
of the branches is always followed by assume false, our transforma-
tion does not lead to a blow-up in the number of paths and allows
us to perform the instrumentation modularly.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented our program trimming algorithm as a tool
called Trimmer, meant as a lightweight pre-processor for program
analyzers that check safety. Our implementation is based on the
LLVM infrastructure [67] and performs instrumentation at the
LLVM bit-code level. Hence, Trimmer can be conveniently inte-
grated into any safety checking tool that is built on top of the LLVM
infrastructure and is capable of analyzing assume statements.
Recall from Section 4 that Trimmer’s safety inference engine
requires alias and side effect information to soundly analyze heap
stores and procedure calls. For this purpose, Trimmer leverages
LLVM’s DSA pointer analysis [68], a highly-scalable, summary-
based, flow-insensitive analysis.
Since Trimmer can be useful to a variety of program analysis
tools (including both static and dynamic analyzers), Trimmer can
be customized in different ways depending on the assumptions
made by subsequent safety checkers. In what follows, we describe
the different configurations that Trimmer provides.
Reasoning about integer arithmetic. Trimmer provides the op-
tion of treating integral-type expressions either as mathematical
(unbounded) or fixed-width integers. Since some safety checkers
ignore integer over- and under-flows but others do not, Trimmer
supports both encodings.2 Analyzers treating values as mathemati-
cal integers can therefore use the configuration of Trimmer that
also makes this same unsound assumption.
Eliminating quantifiers. Recall from Section 4 that the safety
conditions generated by our inference engine contain universal
quantifiers. Hence, when negating the safety conditions, the result-
ing trimming conditions contain existentially-quantified variables.
Trimmer provides two alternatives for eliminating quantifiers. First,
Trimmer can remove quantifiers using Z3’s quantifier elimination
(QE) capabilities [36] after simplifying and pre-processing the for-
mula. Second, Trimmer also allows replacing quantified variables
by calls to non-deterministic functions. Since quantified variables at
the formula level correspond to program variables with unknown
values, this strategy has the same effect as quantifier elimination.
Bounding the instrumentation. After Trimmer instruments the
program with trimming conditions, subsequent safety checkers
need to analyze the assumptions. Hence, the number of additional
assume statements as well as the size of the predicates can affect
the running time of program analyzers. For this reason, Trimmer
allows users to customize where to add assumptions in the code.
For example, sensible strategies include adding instrumentation
right before loops and procedure calls, or before every conditional.
In a similar vein, Trimmer also provides different options for
bounding the size of the formulas used in assume statements. For
example, the user can bound the number of conjuncts in the formula
2For the fixed-width integer encoding, Trimmer strengthens safety conditions by
requiring that there are no integer over- or under-flows. Specifically, Trimmer utilizes
arithmetic operations in the LLVM instruction set that return both the result of the
operation and a flag indicating whether an over-flow occurred. Note that Trimmer
does not use bit-vectors for encoding fixed-width integers.
to be at most k , where k is a value chosen by the user. This strategy
is sound because Trimmer guarantees that the “simplified” formulas
are weaker than the original trimming conditions.
7 EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of program trimming, we have used
Trimmer to pre-process hundreds of programs by instrumenting
them with assume statements. Since these assumptions are not
useful on their own, we evaluate the effect of program trimming
in the context of two different LLVM-based program analyzers for
safety checking. In particular, we use Crab, an abstract interpreter
that supports several abstract domains, and Klee, a widely-used
dynamic symbolic execution engine.
We ran our experiments on 439 programs3, most of which (92%)
are taken from the software verification competition (SV-COMP)
benchmarks, which have clearly defined outcomes and are handled
by numerous tools. Since the errors in many of the buggy programs
in this benchmark set are very shallow4, we also augment these
benchmarks with additional buggy programs, either taken from
other sources or obtained by injecting deeper bugs into safe SV-
COMP benchmarks. The benchmarks taken from SV-COMP span a
broad range of categories, including ControlFlow, Loops, Recur-
sive, and ArrayReach, but exclude categories that are not handled
by Klee or Crab, e.g., BitVectorsReach, Concurrency.
In what follows, we describe the effects of program trimming
on the results of Crab and Klee. We ran all of our experiments on
an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2640 v3 @ 2.60GHz machine with 132 GB
of memory running the Ubuntu 14.04.1 operating system. We used
the latest available version of Crab and the latest version of Klee
that was compatible with LLVM 3.6, which Crab requires.
7.1 Impact of Program Trimming on Crab
To demonstrate that program trimming increases precision across
a range of abstract domains, we compare the performance of Crab
(with and without trimming) on three different domains with vary-
ing levels of precision:
• Int denotes the (non-relational) interval domain [31], which
infers invariants of the form c1 ≤ x ≤ c2;
• Zones is the (relational) zones abstract domain [76], which infers
difference constraints of the form x − y ≤ c;
• RTZ is Crab’s most precise (native) abstract domain and cor-
responds to the reduced product of disjunctive intervals (i.e.,
disjunctions of constraints of the form c1 ≤ x ≤ c2) [45] and the
zones abstract domains.
As mentioned in Section 6, Trimmer can be customized using
a variety of different configurations. To understand the precision
vs. performance trade-off, we evaluate Crab using the configura-
tions of Trimmer shown in Table 1. Here, the column labeledMC
indicates the maximum number of conjuncts used in an assume
statement. The third column labeled QE indicates whether we use
quantifier elimination or whether we model quantified variables
using calls to non-deterministic functions (recall Section 6). Finally,
the columns labeled L/P and C denote the instrumentation strategy.
3Available at: https://mariachris.github.io/FSE2017/benchmarks.zip
4For example, in the existing SV-COMP benchmarks, Klee can find the bug with a
very low resource limit for 85% of the buggy programs.
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Table 1: Overview of trimming configurations (incl. to-
tal number of added assume statements and time for pre-
processing all benchmarks in the two right-most columns).
Configuration MC QE L/P C A Time (s)
TrimL+B 4 143 5.31
TrimB 4 1638 4.97
TrimND+B 4 2801 7.34
TrimL ∞ 156 6.05
Trim ∞ 1735 5.74
TrimND ∞ 2852 8.62
In configurations where there is a checkmark under L/P, we add
assume statements right before loops (L) and before procedure (P)
calls. In configurations where there is a checkmark under C, we also
add instrumentation before every conditional. The two right-most
columns show the total number of added assume statements (not
trivially true) and the pre-processing time for all benchmarks. Since
average trimming time is 11–20 milliseconds per benchmark, we
see that program trimming is indeed very lightweight.
The results of our evaluation are summarized in Table 2. As
we can see from this table, all configurations of program trimming
improve the precision of Crab, and these improvements range from
23% to 54%. For instance, for the interval domain, the most precise
configuration of Trimmer allows the verification of 68 benchmarks
instead of only 49 when using Crab without trimming.
Another observation based on Table 2 is the precision vs. perfor-
mance trade-offs between different configurations of Trimmer. Ver-
sions of Crab that use Trimmerwith QE seem to be faster and more
precise than those configurations of Trimmerwithout QE. In partic-
ular, the version of Trimmerwith QE performs better because there
are fewer variables for the abstract domain to track. We also con-
jecture that Trimmer using QE is more precise because the abstract
domain can introduce imprecision when reasoning about logical
connectives. For instance, consider the formula ∃x .(x = 1 ∧ x , 1),
which is logically equivalent to false, so Trimmer with QE would
instrument the code with assume false. However, if we do not use
QE, we would instrument the code as follows:
x := nondet(); assume x = 1 ∧ x , 1;
When reasoning about the assume statement, an abstract inter-
preter using the interval domain takes the meet of the intervals
[1, 1] and ⊤, which yields [1, 1]. Hence, using Trimmer without QE,
Crab cannot prove that the subsequent code is unreachable.
Summary. Table 2 shows that trimming significantly improves
the precision of an abstract interpreter with reasonable overhead.
Our cheapest trimming configuration (TrimL+B + Int) proves 21%
more programs safe than the most expensive configuration of Crab
without trimming (RTZ) in less than 70% of the time.
7.2 Impact of Program Trimming on Klee
In our second experiment, we evaluate the impact of program trim-
ming on Klee, a state-of-the-art dynamic symbolic execution tool.
We use a subset5 of the variants of Trimmer (see Table 1) and eval-
uate trimming on Klee with three search strategies: breadth-first
search (BFS), depth-first search (DFS), and random search (R).
5In particular, since Klee’s analysis is already path-sensitive we do not consider
variants that instrument before conditionals here.
Table 2: Increased precision of an abstract interpreter due
to trimming. Since Crab treats integers as unbounded, our
instrumentation also makes this assumption.
Configuration Safe Time (s)
Int 49 (+0%) 129 (+0%)
TrimL+B + Int 63 (+29%) 149 (+16%)
TrimB + Int 65 (+33%) 173 (+34%)
TrimND+B + Int 61 (+24%) 198 (+53%)
TrimL + Int 64 (+31%) 151 (+17%)
Trim + Int 68 (+39%) 191 (+48%)
TrimND + Int 62 (+27%) 227 (+76%)
Zones 52 (+0%) 130 (+0%)
TrimL+B + Zones 66 (+27%) 148 (+14%)
TrimB + Zones 68 (+31%) 195 (+50%)
TrimND+B + Zones 64 (+23%) 222 (+71%)
TrimL + Zones 67 (+29%) 150 (+15%)
Trim + Zones 73 (+40%) 281 (+116%)
TrimND + Zones 66 (+27%) 320 (+146%)
RTZ 52 (+0%) 215 (+0%)
TrimL+B + RTZ 67 (+29%) 231 (+7%)
TrimB + RTZ 76 (+46%) 535 (+149%)
TrimND+B + RTZ 66 (+27%) 582 (+171%)
TrimL + RTZ 68 (+31%) 237 (+10%)
Trim + RTZ 80 (+54%) 1620 (+653%)
TrimND + RTZ 67 (+29%) 3330 (+1449%)
Since programs usually have infinitely many execution paths, it
is necessary to enforce some resource bounds when running Klee.
In particular, we run Kleewith a timeout of 300 seconds and a limit
of 64 on the number of forks (i.e., symbolic branches).
The results of our evaluation are presented in Table 3. Here, the
column labeled Safe shows the number of programs for which
Klee explores all execution paths without reporting any errors or
warnings.6 Hence, these programs can be considered verified. The
second column, labeled Unsafe, shows the number of programs
reported as buggy by each variant of Klee. In this context, a bug
corresponds to an explicit assertion violation in the program. Next,
the third column, labeled Paths, shows the number of program
paths that Klee explored for each variant. Note that fewer paths
is better—this means that Klee needs to explore fewer executions
before it finds the bug or proves the absence of an assertion violation.
The next two columns measure the number of programs for which
each Klee variant reaches a resource limit. In particular, the column
labeled Timeout shows the number of programs for which Klee
fails to terminate within the 5-minute time limit. Similarly, the
columnMax-Forks indicates the number of programs for which
each Klee variant reaches the limit that we impose on the number
of forks. Finally, the last column, labeled Time, shows the total
running time of each Klee variant on all benchmarks.
As shown in Table 3, program trimming increases the number of
programs that can be proved safe by 16–18%. Furthermore, program
trimming allows Klee to find up to 30% more bugs within the given
resource limit. In addition, Klee with program trimming needs
to explore significantly fewer paths (up to 38%) and reaches the
resource bound on significantly fewer programs. Finally, observe
that the overall running time of Klee decreases by up to 30%.
6By warning, we mean any internal Klee warning that designates an incompleteness
in Klee’s execution (e.g., solver timeouts and concretizing symbolic values).
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Table 3: Summary of comparison with Klee. Since Klee treats integers in a sound way, we also use the variant of Trimmer that
reasons about integer over- and under-flows.
Configuration Safe Unsafe Paths Timeout Max-Forks Time (s)
KleeBFS 126 (+0%) 118 (+0%) 9231 (+0%) 73 (+0%) 73 (+0%) 21679
TrimL+B + KleeBFS 146 (+16%) 145 (+23%) 5978 (-35%) 52 (-40%) 46 (-51%) 15558
TrimL + KleeBFS 146 (+16%) 153 (+30%) 5678 (-38%) 50 (-32%) 40 (-45%) 15264
KleeDFS 126 (+0%) 99 (+0%) 10024 (+0%) 91 (+0%) 75 (+0%) 26185
TrimL+B + KleeDFS 146 (+16%) 124 (+25%) 6939 (-31%) 72 (-21%) 48 (-36%) 20797
TrimL + KleeDFS 146 (+16%) 129 (+30%) 6695 (-33%) 72 (-21%) 43 (-43%) 21164
KleeR 126 (+0%) 121 (+0%) 9227 (+0%) 71 (+0%) 72 (+0%) 21077
TrimL+B + KleeR 149 (+18%) 146 (+21%) 5967 (-35%) 49 (-31%) 44 (-39%) 14844
TrimL + KleeR 149 (+18%) 152 (+26%) 5699 (-38%) 48 (-32%) 40 (-44%) 14850
Figure 4 compares the number of benchmarks solved by the
original version of Klee (using BFS) with its variants using program
trimming. Specifically, the x-axis shows how many benchmarks
were solved (i.e., identified as safe or unsafe) by each variant (sorted
by running time), and the y-axis shows the corresponding running
time per benchmark. For instance, we can see thatTrimL + KleeBFS
solves 246 benchmarks within less than one second each, whereas
the original version of Klee only solves 203 benchmarks.
Summary. Overall, the results shown in Table 3 and Figure 4
demonstrate that program trimming significantly improves the ef-
fectiveness and performance of a mature, state-of-the-art symbolic
execution tool. In particular, program trimming allows Klee to
find more bugs and prove more programs correct within a given
resource limit independently of its search strategy.
7.3 Threats to Validity
We identified these threats to the validity of our experiments:
• Sample size: We used 439 programs, most of which, however,
are taken from the SV-COMP benchmarks, a widely-used and
established set of verification tasks.
• Safety checkers: We evaluate our technique using two safety
checkers, which, however, are mature and representative of two
program analysis techniques.
• Trimming configurations: We only presented experiments using
a selection of the different configurations that Trimmer provides
(see Section 6). However, all of these configurations are orthogo-
nal to each other, and we evaluated a large variety of them to
demonstrate the benefits of our technique.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
# of solved benchmarks
Ti
m
e
(s)
KleeBFS
TrimL+B + KleeBFS
TrimL + KleeBFS
Figure 4: Quantile plot of time and solved benchmarks for
selected Klee variants.
8 RELATEDWORK
The ideas in this paper are related to a long line of previous work
on program transformations and safety precondition inference.
Program slicing. One of the most well-known program simplifi-
cation techniques is program slicing, which removes program state-
ments that are not relevant to some criterion of interest (e.g., value
of a variable at some program point) [1, 15, 84, 85]. A program slice
can be computed either statically or dynamically and includes both
forward and backward variants. Program trimming differs from
traditional program slicing in two ways: first, trimming focuses
on removing execution paths as opposed to statements; second, it
is meant as a pre-processing technique for safety checkers rather
than a transformation to aid program understanding. In particular,
a typical slicing tool may not produce compilable and runnable
code that could be consumed by subsequent safety checkers.
More semantic variants of program slicing have also been con-
sidered in later work [5, 20, 30, 46, 54, 64]. For instance, Jhala and
Majumdar propose path slicing to improve the scalability of soft-
ware model checkers [64]. In particular, path slicing eliminates all
operations that are irrelevant toward the reachability of the target
location in a given program path. Unlike program trimming, path
slicing is not used as a pre-processing step and works on a single
program path that corresponds to a counterexample trace.
Prior work has also considered how to slice the program with
respect to a predicate [20, 30, 46, 54]. Such techniques can be useful
for program understanding, for example, when the user only wants
to see statements that affect a given condition (e.g., the predicate
of a conditional). In contrast, program trimming is not meant as a
program understanding technique and removes program paths that
are irrelevant for a given safety property. Furthermore, the trimmed
program is not meant for human consumption, as it semantically
prunes program paths through the insertion of assume statements.
In general, slicing has been used before invoking a program
analyzer [22, 23, 44, 55, 62, 63, 75]. A key difference with these ap-
proaches is that the result of trimming is valid code, which compiles
and runs, instead of an abstract representation, such as a control
flow graph or model.
Pre-processing for program analyzers. In the same spirit as this pa-
per, prior work has also used program transformations to improve
the precision or scalability of program analyzers [24, 26, 27, 53,
66, 83, 87]. For instance, a transformation for faster goal-directed
search [66] moves all assertions to a single main procedure with
the goal of speeding up analysis. Another program transformation
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called loop splitting aims to improve the precision of program ana-
lyzers by turning multi-phase loops into a sequence of single-phase
loops [83]. However, neither of these techniques instrument the
program with assumptions to guide safety checking tools.
Recent techniques rely on the verification results of a full-fledged
analyzer, such as an abstract interpreter or a model checker, to guide
automatic test case generation tools [24, 26, 34, 35] or other static
analyzers [13, 25, 27, 87], some even using slicing as an intermediate
step [34]. In contrast, program trimming is more lightweight by
not relying on previous analyzers and, thus, can be used as a pre-
processing step for any safety checker.
Precondition inference. The use of precondition inference dates
back to the dawn of program verification [37]. Most verification
techniques infer a sufficient condition for program safety and prove
the correctness of the program by showing the validity of this
condition [8, 10, 21, 37, 47, 58–60, 77]. In this work, we do not aim
to infer the weakest possible safety precondition; instead, we use
lightweight, modular static analysis to infer a sufficient condition
for safety. Furthermore, we use safety conditions to prune program
paths rather than to verify the program.
Program trimming hinges on the observation that the negation
of a sufficient condition for property P yields a necessary condition
for the negation of P . Prior program analysis techniques also exploit
the same observation [39–41, 89]. For instance, this duality has been
used to perform modular path-sensitive analysis [39] and strong
updates on elements of unbounded data structures [40, 41].
While most program analysis techniques focus on the inference
of sufficient preconditions to guarantee safety, some techniques
also infer necessary preconditions [32, 33, 72, 73, 78]. For example,
Verification Modulo Versions (VMV) infers both necessary and suf-
ficient conditions and utilizes previous versions of the program to
reduce the number of warnings reported by verifiers [73]. Similarly,
necessary conditions are inferred to repair the program in such a
way that the repair does not remove any “good” traces [72]. Finally,
the techniques described by Cousot et al. infer necessary precon-
ditions, which are used to improve the effectiveness of the Code
Contracts abstract interpreter [32, 33, 45].
Abductive reasoning. There has been significant work on program
analysis using abductive reasoning, which looks for a sufficient
condition that implies a desired goal [3, 19, 38, 42, 43, 70, 90]. Our
analysis for computing safety conditions can be viewed as a form
of abductive reasoning in that we generate sufficient conditions
that are stronger than necessary for ensuring safety. However, we
perform this kind of reasoning in a very lightweight way without
calling an SMT solver or invoking a logical decision procedure.
Modular interprocedural analysis. The safety condition inference
we have proposed in this paper is modular in the sense that it ana-
lyzes each procedure independently of its callers. There are many
previous techniques for performing modular (summary-based) anal-
ysis [2, 19, 39, 80, 88]. Our technique differs from these approaches
in several ways: First, our procedure summaries only contain safety
preconditions, but not post-conditions, as we handle procedure
side effects in a very conservative way. Second, we do not perform
fixed-point computations and achieve soundness by initializing
summaries to false. Finally, we use summary-based analysis for
program transformation rather than verification.
Property-directed program analysis. There is a significant body of
work that aims to make program analyzers property directed. Many
of these techniques, such as BLAST [12, 56, 57], SLAM [4, 6, 7], and
YOGI [51, 79] rely on counterexample-guided abstraction refine-
ment (CEGAR) [29] to iteratively refine an analysis based on coun-
terexample traces. Another example of a property-directed analy-
sis is the IC3/PDR algorithm [16, 61], which iteratively performs
forward and backward analysis for bounded program executions
to decide reachability queries. Although abstract interpretation is
traditionally not property directed, there is recent work [81] on
adapting and rephrasing IC3/PDR in the framework of abstract
interpretation. In contrast, we propose a general pre-processing
technique to make any eager program analysis property directed.
Path-exploration strategies. Most symbolic execution and test-
ing techniques utilize different strategies to explore the possible
execution paths of a program. For example, there are strategies
that prioritize “deeper paths” (in depth-first search), “less-traveled
paths” [71], “number of new instructions covered” (in breadth-first
search), “distance from a target line” [74], or “paths specified by the
programmer” [82]. In the context of symbolic execution, program
trimming can be viewed as a search strategy that prunes safe paths
and steers exploration toward paths that are more likely to con-
tain bugs. However, as shown in our experiments, our technique is
beneficial independently of a particular search strategy.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed program trimming, a program sim-
plification technique that aims to reduce the number of execution
paths while preserving safety. Program trimming can allow any
safety checker to be goal directed by pruning execution paths that
cannot possibly result in an assertion violation. Furthermore, be-
cause our proposed trimming algorithm is very lightweight, it can
be used as an effective pre-processing tool for many program ana-
lyzers. As shown by our evaluation, program trimming allows an
abstract interpreter, namely Crab, to verify 21% more programs
while cutting running time by 30%. Trimming also allows Klee, a
dynamic symbolic execution engine, to find more bugs and verify
more programs within a given resource limit.
In future work, we plan to investigate the impact of program
trimming on other kinds of program analyzers, such as bounded
model checkers. We also plan to investigate alternative program
trimming algorithms and strategies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Cristian Cadar and Martin Nowack for their
help with Klee. We would also like to thank the main developer
of Crab, Jorge Navas, for his help with Crab and for his positive
feedback on the usefulness of program trimming. We are grateful
to Microsoft for partly funding the first three authors and to the
anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. This work
is supported by AFRL Award FA8750-15-2-0096 and NSF Award
#1453386. The views and conclusions contained herein are those
of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily repre-
senting the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or
implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
10
REFERENCES
[1] Hiralal Agrawal and Joseph Robert Horgan. 1990. Dynamic Program Slicing. In
PLDI. ACM, 246–256.
[2] Alex Aiken, Suhabe Bugrara, Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, Brian Hackett, and Peter
Hawkins. 2007. An Overview of the Saturn Project. In PASTE. ACM, 43–48.
[3] Aws Albarghouthi, Isil Dillig, and Arie Gurfinkel. 2016. Maximal Specification
Synthesis. In POPL. ACM, 789–801.
[4] Thomas Ball, Rupak Majumdar, Todd D. Millstein, and Sriram K. Rajamani. 2001.
Automatic Predicate Abstraction of C Programs. In PLDI. ACM, 203–213.
[5] Thomas Ball, Mayur Naik, and Sriram K. Rajamani. 2003. From Symptom to
Cause: Localizing Errors in Counterexample Traces. In POPL. ACM, 97–105.
[6] Thomas Ball and Sriram K. Rajamani. 2001. The SLAM Toolkit. In CAV (LNCS),
Vol. 2102. Springer, 260–264.
[7] Thomas Ball and Sriram K. Rajamani. 2002. The SLAM Project: Debugging
System Software via Static Analysis. In POPL. ACM, 1–3.
[8] Michael Barnett, Bor-Yuh Evan Chang, Robert DeLine, Bart Jacobs, and K. Rus-
tan M. Leino. 2005. Boogie: A Modular Reusable Verifier for Object-Oriented
Programs. In FMCO (LNCS), Vol. 4111. Springer, 364–387.
[9] Mike Barnett, Manuel Fähndrich, K. Rustan M. Leino, Peter Müller, Wolfram
Schulte, and Herman Venter. 2011. Specification and Verification: The Spec#
Experience. CACM 54 (2011), 81–91. Issue 6.
[10] Mike Barnett and K. Rustan M. Leino. 2005. Weakest-Precondition of Unstruc-
tured Programs. In PASTE. ACM, 82–87.
[11] Dirk Beyer. 2017. Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP). (2017).
https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org.
[12] Dirk Beyer, Thomas A. Henzinger, Ranjit Jhala, and Rupak Majumdar. 2007. The
Software Model Checker BLAST: Applications to Software Engineering. STTT 9
(2007), 505–525. Issue 5.
[13] Dirk Beyer, Thomas A. Henzinger, M. Erkan Keremoglu, and Philipp Wendler.
2012. Conditional Model Checking: A Technique to Pass Information between
Verifiers. In FSE. ACM, 57–67.
[14] Armin Biere, Alessandro Cimatti, Edmund M. Clarke, and Yunshan Zhu. 1999.
Symbolic Model Checking without BDDs. In TACAS (LNCS), Vol. 1579. Springer,
193–207.
[15] David Binkley and Keith Brian Gallagher. 1996. Program Slicing. Advances in
Computers 43 (1996), 1–50.
[16] Aaron R. Bradley. 2011. SAT-Based Model Checking Without Unrolling. In
VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 6538. Springer, 70–87.
[17] Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dunbar, andDawson R. Engler. 2008. KLEE: Unassisted and
Automatic Generation of High-Coverage Tests for Complex Systems Programs.
In OSDI. USENIX, 209–224.
[18] Cristian Cadar and Dawson R. Engler. 2005. Execution Generated Test Cases:
How to Make Systems Code Crash Itself. In SPIN (LNCS), Vol. 3639. Springer,
2–23.
[19] Cristiano Calcagno, Dino Distefano, Peter W. O’Hearn, and Hongseok Yang.
2009. Compositional Shape Analysis by Means of Bi-Abduction. In POPL. ACM,
289–300.
[20] Gerardo Canfora, Aniello Cimitile, and Andrea de Lucia. 1998. Conditioned
Program Slicing. IST 40 (1998), 595–607. Issue 11–12.
[21] Satish Chandra, Stephen J. Fink, and Manu Sridharan. 2009. Snugglebug: A
Powerful Approach to Weakest Preconditions. In PLDI. ACM, 363–374.
[22] Omar Chebaro, Nikolai Kosmatov, Alain Giorgetti, and Jacques Julliand. 2012.
Program Slicing Enhances a Verification Technique Combining Static and Dy-
namic Analysis. In SAC. ACM, 1284–1291.
[23] Yunja Choi, Mingyu Park, Taejoon Byun, and Dongwoo Kim. 2015. Efficient
Safety Checking for Automotive Operating Systems Using Property-Based Slicing
and Constraint-Based Environment Generation. Sci. Comput. Program. 103 (2015),
51–70. Issue 1.
[24] Maria Christakis. 2015. Narrowing the Gap between Verification and Systematic
Testing. Ph.D. Dissertation. ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
[25] Maria Christakis, Peter Müller, and Valentin Wüstholz. 2012. Collaborative
Verification and Testing with Explicit Assumptions. In FM (LNCS), Vol. 7436.
Springer, 132–146.
[26] Maria Christakis, Peter Müller, and Valentin Wüstholz. 2016. Guiding Dynamic
Symbolic Execution Toward Unverified Program Executions. In ICSE. ACM,
144–155.
[27] Maria Christakis and Valentin Wüstholz. 2016. Bounded Abstract Interpretation.
In SAS (LNCS), Vol. 9837. Springer, 105–125.
[28] EdmundM. Clarke, Armin Biere, Richard Raimi, and Yunshan Zhu. 2001. Bounded
Model Checking Using Satisfiability Solving. FMSD 19 (2001), 7–34. Issue 1.
[29] Edmund M. Clarke, Orna Grumberg, Somesh Jha, Yuan Lu, and Helmut Veith.
2000. Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement. In CAV (LNCS), Vol. 1855.
Springer, 154–169.
[30] Joseph J. Comuzzi and Johnson M. Hart. 1996. Program Slicing Using Weakest
Preconditions. In FME (LNCS), Vol. 1051. Springer, 557–575.
[31] Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot. 1977. Abstract Interpretation: A Unified
Lattice Model for Static Analysis of Programs by Construction or Approximation
of Fixpoints. In POPL. ACM, 238–252.
[32] Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot, Manuel Fähndrich, and Francesco Logozzo. 2013.
Automatic Inference of Necessary Preconditions. In VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 7737.
Springer, 128–148.
[33] Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot, and Francesco Logozzo. 2011. Precondition Infer-
ence from Intermittent Assertions and Application to Contracts on Collections.
In VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 6538. Springer, 150–168.
[34] Mike Czech, Marie-Christine Jakobs, and Heike Wehrheim. 2015. Just Test What
You Cannot Verify!. In FASE (LNCS), Vol. 9033. Springer, 100–114.
[35] PrzemyslawDaca, Ashutosh Gupta, Henzinger, and Thomas A. 2016. Abstraction-
Driven Concolic Testing. In VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 9583. Springer, 328–347.
[36] Leonardo de Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An Efficient SMT Solver. In
TACAS (LNCS), Vol. 4963. Springer, 337–340.
[37] Edsger W. Dijkstra. 1975. Guarded Commands, Nondeterminacy and Formal
Derivation of Programs. CACM 18 (1975), 453–457. Issue 8.
[38] Isil Dillig and Thomas Dillig. 2013. Explain: A Tool for Performing Abductive
Inference. In CAV (LNCS), Vol. 8044. Springer, 684–689.
[39] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, and Alex Aiken. 2008. Sound, Complete and Scalable
Path-Sensitive Analysis. In PLDI. ACM, 270–280.
[40] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, and Alex Aiken. 2010. Fluid Updates: Beyond Strong
vs. Weak Updates. In ESOP (LNCS), Vol. 6012. Springer, 246–266.
[41] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, and Alex Aiken. 2011. Precise Reasoning for Programs
Using Containers. In POPL. ACM, 187–200.
[42] Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, Boyang Li, and Kenneth L. McMillan. 2013. Inductive
Invariant Generation via Abductive Inference. In OOPSLA. ACM, 443–456.
[43] Thomas Dillig, Isil Dillig, and Swarat Chaudhuri. 2014. Optimal Guard Synthesis
for Memory Safety. In CAV (LNCS), Vol. 8559. Springer, 491–507.
[44] Julian Dolby, Mandana Vaziri, and Frank Tip. 2007. Finding Bugs Efficiently with
a SAT Solver. In ESEC/FSE. ACM, 195–204.
[45] Manuel Fähndrich and Francesco Logozzo. 2010. Static Contract Checking with
Abstract Interpretation. In FoVeOOS (LNCS), Vol. 6528. Springer, 10–30.
[46] John Field, Ganesan Ramalingam, and Frank Tip. 1995. Parametric Program
Slicing. In POPL. ACM, 379–392.
[47] Cormac Flanagan, K. Rustan M. Leino, Mark Lillibridge, Greg Nelson, James B.
Saxe, and Raymie Stata. 2002. Extended Static Checking for Java. In PLDI. ACM,
234–245.
[48] Graeme Gange, Jorge A. Navas, Peter Schachte, Harald Søndergaard, and Peter J.
Stuckey. 2016. An Abstract Domain of Uninterpreted Functions. In VMCAI
(LNCS), Vol. 9583. Springer, 85–103.
[49] Graeme Gange, Jorge A. Navas, Peter Schachte, Harald Søndergaard, and Peter J.
Stuckey. 2016. Exploiting Sparsity in Difference-Bound Matrices. In SAS (LNCS),
Vol. 9837. Springer, 189–211.
[50] Patrice Godefroid, Nils Klarlund, and Koushik Sen. 2005. DART: Directed Auto-
mated Random Testing. In PLDI. ACM, 213–223.
[51] Patrice Godefroid, Aditya V. Nori, Sriram K. Rajamani, and SaiDeep Tetali. 2010.
Compositional May-Must Program Analysis: Unleashing the Power of Alterna-
tion. In POPL. ACM, 43–56.
[52] Susanne Graf and Hassen Saïdi. 1997. Construction of Abstract State Graphs
with PVS. In CAV (LNCS), Vol. 1254. Springer, 72–83.
[53] Arie Gurfinkel, Ou Wei, and Marsha Chechik. 2008. Model Checking Recursive
Programs with Exact Predicate Abstraction. In ATVA (LNCS), Vol. 5311. Springer,
95–110.
[54] Mark Harman, Robert M. Hierons, Chris Fox, Sebastian Danicic, and John
Howroyd. 2001. Pre/Post Conditioned Slicing. In ICSM. IEEE Computer Society,
138–147.
[55] John Hatcliff, Matthew B. Dwyer, and Hongjun Zheng. 2000. Slicing Software for
Model Construction. Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation 13 (2000), 315–353.
Issue 4.
[56] Thomas A. Henzinger, Ranjit Jhala, Rupak Majumdar, and Kenneth L. McMillan.
2004. Abstractions from proofs. In POPL. ACM, 232–244.
[57] Thomas A. Henzinger, Ranjit Jhala, Rupak Majumdar, and Grégoire Sutre. 2002.
Lazy Abstraction. In POPL. ACM, 58–70.
[58] C. A. R. Hoare. 1969. An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming. CACM
12 (1969), 576–580. Issue 10.
[59] C. A. R. Hoare. 1971. Procedures and Parameters: An Axiomatic Approach. In
Symposium on Semantics of Algorithmic Languages. Lecture Notes inMathematics,
Vol. 188. Springer, 102–116.
[60] C. A. R. Hoare and Jifeng He. 1987. The Weakest Prespecification. Inf. Process.
Lett. 24 (1987), 127–132. Issue 2.
[61] Krystof Hoder and Nikolaj Bjørner. 2012. Generalized Property Directed Reacha-
bility. In SAT (LNCS), Vol. 7317. Springer, 157–171.
[62] Franjo Ivancic, Zijiang Yang, Malay K. Ganai, Aarti Gupta, Ilya Shlyakhter, and
Pranav Ashar. 2005. F-Soft: Software Verification Platform. In CAV (LNCS),
Vol. 3576. Springer, 301–306.
[63] Joxan Jaffar and Vijayaraghavan Murali. 2014. A Path-Sensitively Sliced Control
Flow Graph. In FSE. ACM, 133–143.
[64] Ranjit Jhala and Rupak Majumdar. 2005. Path Slicing. In PLDI. ACM, 38–47.
11
[65] James C. King. 1976. Symbolic Execution and Program Testing. CACM 19 (1976),
385–394. Issue 7.
[66] Akash Lal and Shaz Qadeer. 2014. A Program Transformation for Faster Goal-
Directed Search. In FMCAD. IEEE Computer Society, 147–154.
[67] Chris Lattner and Vikram S. Adve. 2004. LLVM: A Compilation Framework for
Lifelong Program Analysis & Transformation. In CGO. IEEE Computer Society,
75–88.
[68] Chris Lattner, Andrew Lenharth, and Vikram S. Adve. 2007. Making Context-
Sensitive Points-to Analysis with Heap Cloning Practical for the Real World. In
PLDI. ACM, 278–289.
[69] K. Rustan M. Leino. 2005. Efficient Weakest Preconditions. IPL 93 (2005), 281–288.
Issue 6.
[70] Boyang Li, Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, Kenneth L. McMillan, and Mooly Sagiv.
2013. Synthesis of Circular Compositional Program Proofs via Abduction. In
TACAS (LNCS), Vol. 7795. Springer, 370–384.
[71] You Li, Zhendong Su, LinzhangWang, and Xuandong Li. 2013. Steering Symbolic
Execution to Less Traveled Paths. In OOPSLA. ACM, 19–32.
[72] Francesco Logozzo and Thomas Ball. 2012. Modular and Verified Automatic
Program Repair. In OOPSLA. ACM, 133–146.
[73] Francesco Logozzo, Shuvendu K. Lahiri, Manuel Fähndrich, and Sam Blackshear.
2014. Verification Modulo Versions: Towards Usable Verification. In PLDI. ACM,
294–304.
[74] Kin-Keung Ma, Yit Phang Khoo, Jeffrey S. Foster, and Michael Hicks. 2011. Di-
rected Symbolic Execution. In SAS (LNCS), Vol. 6887. Springer, 95–111.
[75] Lynette I. Millett and Tim Teitelbaum. 2000. Issues in Slicing PROMELA and Its
Applications to Model Checking, Protocol Understanding, and Simulation. STTT
2 (2000), 343–349. Issue 4.
[76] Antoine Miné. 2004. Weakly Relational Numerical Abstract Domains. (Domaines
Numériques Abstraits Faiblement Relationnels). Ph.D. Dissertation. École Poly-
technique, Palaiseau, France.
[77] Yannick Moy. 2008. Sufficient Preconditions for Modular Assertion Checking. In
VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 4905. Springer, 188–202.
[78] Mayur Naik, Hongseok Yang, Ghila Castelnuovo, and Mooly Sagiv. 2012. Ab-
stractions from Tests. In POPL. ACM, 373–386.
[79] Aditya V. Nori, Sriram K. Rajamani, Saideep Tetali, and Aditya V. Thakur. 2009.
The YOGI Project: Software Property Checking via Static Analysis and Testing.
In TACAS (LNCS), Vol. 5505. Springer, 178–181.
[80] Amir Pnueli and Micha Sharir. 1981. Two Approaches to Interprocedural Data
Flow Analysis. Program Flow Analysis: Theory and Applications (1981), 189–234.
[81] Noam Rinetzky and Sharon Shoham. 2016. Property Directed Abstract Interpre-
tation. In VMCAI (LNCS), Vol. 9583. Springer, 104–123.
[82] Koushik Sen, Haruto Tanno, Xiaojing Zhang, and Takashi Hoshino. 2015.
GuideSE: Annotations for Guiding Concolic Testing. In AST. IEEE Computer
Society, 23–27.
[83] Rahul Sharma, Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig, and Alex Aiken. 2011. Simplifying
Loop Invariant Generation Using Splitter Predicates. In CAV (LNCS), Vol. 6806.
Springer, 703–719.
[84] Frank Tip. 1995. A Survey of Program Slicing Techniques. J. Prog. Lang. 3 (1995),
121–189. Issue 3.
[85] Mark Weiser. 1981. Program Slicing. In ICSE. IEEE Computer Society, 439–449.
[86] Glynn Winskel. 2012. The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages: An
Introduction. MIT Press.
[87] Valentin Wüstholz. 2015. Partial Verification Results. Ph.D. Dissertation. ETH
Zurich, Switzerland.
[88] Greta Yorsh, Eran Yahav, and Satish Chandra. 2008. Generating Precise and
Concise Procedure Summaries. In POPL. ACM, 221–234.
[89] Xin Zhang, Mayur Naik, and Hongseok Yang. 2013. Finding Optimum Abstrac-
tions in Parametric Dataflow Analysis. In PLDI. ACM, 365–376.
[90] Haiyan Zhu, Thomas Dillig, and Isil Dillig. 2013. Automated Inference of Library
Specifications for Source-Sink Property Verification. In APLAS (LNCS), Vol. 8301.
Springer, 290–306.
A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.6
Proof sketch. For most statements (e.g., assignment, assump-
tion, assertion), Φ′ is just the standard weakest precondition of s
with respect to Φ.
For heap reads andwrites, we already arguedwhyΦ′ ⇒ wp(s,Φ).
The heap allocation rule is also correct since it “havocs” the allocated
pointer.
The correctness of the procedure call rule follows from the fol-
lowing two facts: First, summary(prc, ϒ, v¯) is a conservative safety
condition for the call to f . In particular, if f ∈ dom(ϒ), this follows
from the soundness of ϒ. If f < dom(ϒ), false (resp. true) is a suf-
ficient condition for the safety of any procedure that does (resp.
does not) contain an assertion. Second, we “havoc” the value of
any memory location modified in f . The correctness of our havoc
operation follows from (a) the correctness of the store function, and
(b) ∀v .ϕ ⇒ wp(v := e,ϕ) for any expression e . □
B PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of statements
(i.e., n − i).
Suppose i = n. If sn is not an assertion, then the safety condition
is true, so we add assume false. Since sn can never fail, false is
indeed necessary for failure. If sn is assert ϕ, then the necessary
condition for failure is ¬ϕ. Since the safety condition for sn is ϕ,
our technique instruments the code with assume ¬ϕ.
For the inductive step, suppose i < n and let:
Λ, ϒ, true ⊢ si+1; . . . ; sn : Φ
By the inductive hypothesis, ¬Φ is a necessary condition for the
failure of si+1, . . . , sn . We consider three cases: (1) si is an assertion
assert ϕ. Then, the necessary condition for the failure of si ; . . . ; sn
is ¬ϕ ∨ ¬Φ. Since the safety condition for si ; . . . ; sn is ϕ ∧ Φ, our
technique instruments the code with assume ¬ϕ ∨¬Φ. (2) If si is an
assumption assume ϕ, the necessary condition for failure is ϕ ∧¬Φ,
which is exactly the trimming condition computed by our technique.
(3) Otherwise, the necessary condition for failure is wp(si ,¬Φ).
Suppose Λ, ϒ,Φ ⊢ si : Φ′. By soundness of the safety condition
inference, we have Φ′ ⇒ wp(si ,Φ), and we instrument the code
with assume¬Φ′. Since si is neither an assertion nor an assumption,
we have wp(si ,¬Φ) ≡ ¬wp(si ,Φ); thus, wp(si ,¬Φ) ⇒ ¬Φ′. □
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